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ABSTRACT 
 
DEREK HOLMGREN: “Gateway to Freedom” and Instrument of Order: The Friedland 
Transit Camp, 1945-1955 
(Under the direction of Konrad Jarausch) 
 
 
 
 This thesis examines the history of the Friedland transit camp for German 
refugees, expellees from Eastern Europe, and returning prisoners of war from 1945 to 
1955. It contends that the camp functioned as a crucial provider of “regulated 
humanitarianism” for the over one million individuals processed there and for the 
surrounding West German society. The facility offered humanitarian assistance, but it 
also regulated the flow of incoming individuals in order to prevent a deluge from 
uprooted masses. To accomplish this mission, the camp both relied upon and fostered the 
reestablishment of civil organizations. Yet, as this thesis also demonstrates, the camp 
became a space onto which locals, German administrators, and Allied authorities 
projected fears of the very instability it was meant to solve. The Friedland facility thus 
stood at the intersection of postwar stability and security concerns and informs the history 
of postwar German reconstruction. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On a cold November morning in 1945 rumors concerning a mass of incoming 
refugees swirled around the Friedland transit camp (Grenzdurchgangslager) in British-
occupied Germany. No one was sure how many refugees and expellees were waiting to 
cross into the British zone via Friedland, and there was fear that the mass would deluge 
the camp. According to the distressed British military government, “there is a queue on 
the other side of the barrier [in the Russian zone] stretching for anything up to 20 
kilometers.”1 A British volunteer at the camp, David Sainty, later submitted a report that 
was less alarmist than his countrymen’s but that nonetheless described a troubling 
situation: “There is a queue of about 6000 People [sic] from 9 to 12, and some stragglers 
along the road…Beyond that of course we don’t know.”2 
This vignette is important reminder of the humanitarian crisis facing Germany 
after World War II. In addition to the destruction of infrastructure and the flotsam of 
homeless persons produced by Allied bombing, German and occupational authorities 
contended with waves of refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe. Already in 1944, 
masses of Germans fled westward from advancing Soviet troops and were followed by a 
second wave of so-called “wild expulsions” at the war’s conclusion. The transit camp at 
                                                 
1
 “Report 31,” November 26, 1945, B 45 11 26 – 1 01. Archives of the Service Civil International 
(hereafter ASCI). 
 
2
 Ibid. 
    
     2 
the small town of Friedland established in the fall of 1945 was initially meant as a 
stopgap measure to provide aid for the individuals at the tail end of this second wave. 
Yet, because of its strategic location on major rail lines at the zonal triangle 
(Zonendreieck) where the British, American, and Russian sectors met, the camp grew 
considerably in both size and importance during the subsequent third wave of officially 
sanctioned expulsions conducted as part of the Potsdam settlement between the Allies. 
Alongside these expellees, the facility also served as a processing point for returning 
prisoners of war and other civilian returnees (Heimkehrer) from prisons and work camps 
in Eastern Europe. Having processed some 1.7 million individuals from 1945 to 1949, the 
Friedland camp stood ready when a smaller, fourth wave of resettlement began in 1950, 
which consisted of those remaining ethnic Germans who had not been caught up in the 
previous transfers. All told, the Friedland camp processed over 1.8 million individuals 
from 1945 to 1955, including expellees, refugees, and returning prisoners of war.3 
The timing of the Friedland camp’s establishment and operation speaks to its 
historical significance beyond just the astonishing number of individuals who passed 
through it. The end of the second and beginning of the third phases of expulsions, when 
the camp operated at its highest capacity, was also a moment when local and 
occupational authorities began to reestablish control over the reception of these 
individuals. As such, an examination of the Friedland facility’s history underlines the 
humanitarian imperatives under which the camp operated, the increasing efforts to 
provide and maintain the orderly reception necessary for eventual German reconstruction, 
and the relationship between these two missions. This paper therefore considers the 
                                                 
3
 Statistics taken from “Grenzdurchgangslager Friedland 1945-2005," ed. Niedersächsisches Ministerium 
für Inneres und Sport (Hannover: Landesvermessung und Geobasisinformationen Niedersachsen, 2005), 
20-21. 
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operation of Friedland within the broader issue of Germany’s material, social, and 
administrative reconstruction after the war. In particular it contends that the camp was a 
site of convergence for concerns about West German security and stability. It also argues 
that examination of the camp’s history offers a means of interrogating the interaction 
between humanitarian concerns and the need to establish order. Finally, this paper 
demonstrates that the establishment and operation of the camp created a physical space 
onto which the press and occupational and German authorities could project fears of 
disorder, thereby exacerbating perceptions of the very insecurity the camp was meant to 
solve.4 
 The Friedland camp emerged as a response to the displacement of Germans in the 
aftermath of World War II and should therefore be considered within the historiography 
of forced population transfers in the twentieth century. Early efforts to document 
Europe’s post-World War II transfers regarded them as a product of the war rather than 
as a continuation of prewar and wartime practices.5 Alfred Maurice de Zayas’ 
controversial, polemical history of the expulsion of Germans likewise focused on postwar 
events and missed important historical continuities.6 More recent studies of ethnic 
                                                 
4
 This argument draws from social science literature (itself based upon theoretical work by Michel Foucault 
and Giorgio Agamben) that sees the camp as a physically delineated “state of exception” used to identify its 
residents as an “other” or outsiders in an inside/outside social dichotomy with the goal of re-imposing 
social discipline and order. See particularly, Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, The Culture of 
Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp (London: Routledge, 2005), 10, 79. For the purposes of this paper, 
it seems reasonable to build upon Diken and Laustsen’s notion of a camp’s physical space and its relation 
to social order and argue that authorities and the general population can assign meaning to camps by 
projecting the desire for order and the fear of disorder on that space. 
 
5
 See Theodor Schieder, "Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-
Neiße," Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa (Bonn: Bundesministerium 
für Vertriebene, 1954-1960), and Joseph B. Schechtman, Postwar Population Transfers in Europe 1945-
1955 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962). 
 
6
 Alfred Maurice de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Expulsion of Germans from the East (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977). 
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Germans in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe thus help to contextualize the postwar 
expulsions by highlighting Nazi efforts to expel Eastern Europeans from their homes and 
businesses in favor of ethnic German replacements. Indeed, the disruption of ethnic 
German populations had actually begun under the Nazi program of resettlement during 
the war.7 The expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe should therefore be regarded as 
a continuation of population disruptions begun by the Nazis but which also proceeded 
through the drastic uprooting of historic German communities scattered throughout 
Eastern Europe. 
Yet transfers during and after World War II also need to be seen within the 
context of earlier twentieth-century practices. In this respect, Michael Marrus’ 1985 study 
has helpfully located the Second World War and its aftermath as a crescendo in a broader 
twentieth-century problem of refugees produced by the fall of European empires during 
and after the First World War.8 Mark Mazower has further linked transfers to underlying 
political trends in twentieth-century Europe, in which transfers highlight the emerging 
consensus that successful states are constructed through national homogeneity.9 
 The Friedland transit camp also fits into a relatively narrower historiography of 
transit and refugee camps for Germans uprooted by World War II. Early publications 
celebrated the camps’ humanitarian efforts, while critical analyses emerged later. Thus 
for Friedland, early commemorations such as Das Buch von Friedland and 20 Jahre 
                                                 
7
 Valdis O. Lumans, Himmler's Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German Minorities of 
Europe, 1933-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), and Doris Bergen, 
"Tenuousness and Tenacity: The Volksdeutschen of Eastern Europe, World War II, and the Holocaust," in 
The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness, ed. Krista O'Donnell, Renate Bridenthal, and Nancy 
Reagin (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005). 
 
8
 Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985). 
 
9
 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage Books, 1998). 
    
     5 
Lager Friedland highlighted the camp’s role in providing aid to the millions who passed 
through it.10 These books also helped to establish Friedland’s reputation as the “Gateway 
to Freedom” (Tor zur Freiheit) that appears in recent celebrations, such as a book 
published for the camp’s sixtieth anniversary and the various tributes to the charitable 
organizations that volunteered in the camp.11 
Academic scholarship on Friedland began with Dagmar Kleineke’s 1992 
dissertation on the camp’s operational history from 1945 to 1955.12 More recently, 
Andrea Riecken has discussed the camp within the contexts of health policy and refugee 
integration in the British zone.13 Friedland has also featured in postwar memory studies, 
such as Robert Moeller’s discussion of returning prisoners of war, Birgit Schwelling’s 
article on public memory and the construction of the Friedland memorial, and Sasha 
Schießl’s examination of memory and Friedland’s “Gateway to Freedom” moniker.14 
                                                 
10
 Walter Müller-Bringmann, Das Buch von Friedland (Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1956). See also 
20 Jahre Lager Friedland,  (Heidelberg: Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, und 
Kriegsgeschädigte, 1965).  
 
11
 Jürgen Gückel, 60 Jahre Lager Friedland: Zeitzeugen berichten (Göttingen: Göttinger Tageblatt GmbH 
& Co. KG, 2005). Commemorative histories of charitable organizations include Wilhelm Tomm, Bewegte 
Jahre, erzählte Geschichte (Friedland: Innere Mission, 1992) and Karoline Grothe, Ein Stück Leben 
(Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2007). 
 
12
 Dagmar Kleineke, "Entstehung und Entwicklung des Lagers Friedland 1945-1955" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Universität Göttingen, 1992). She has also authored "Das Grenzdurchgangslager Friedland: Heimkehrer, 
Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene, Um- und Aussiedler," in Zuwanderung und Integration in Niedersachsen seit 
dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Klaus J. Bade and Joachen Oltmer (Osnabrück: Universitätsverlag Rasch, 
2002), and "Das Lager Friedland und die konfessionellen Verbände," in Vertreibung und Ankunft in 
Niedersachsen, ed. Ellen Ueberschar (Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 2007). 
 
13
 Andrea Riecken, Migration und Gesundheitspolitik: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Niedersachsen 1945-
1953 (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2006). 
 
14
 Respectively, Robert Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Birgit Schwelling, "Gedenken im Nachkrieg. 
Die "Friedland-Gedächtnisstätte," Zeithistorische Forschungen Online-Ausgabe 5, no. 2 (2008). See also 
Maik Tändler, Tagungsbericht “Fremd im eigenen Land“: Diasporic cultures – diasporic mentalities? 
18.09.2009-19.09.2009, Göttingen, in: H-Soz-u-Kult, 10.10.2009, <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-
berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=2496>. 
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Yet, other than an aside in Kleineke’s dissertation,15 histories of Friedland have not 
considered its relationship to concerns about reestablishing order in occupied Germany 
and rebuilding a stable, western-oriented German republic. This paper will address both 
domestic and international aspects of the stability and security difficulties. 
 This study proceeds in five sections that will consider significant events in the 
Friedland camp’s history, both chronologically and thematically. Each section also 
addresses a significant demographic group in the camp’s history from 1945 to 1955 (see 
Appendix A for a demographic breakdown of persons registered). The first two sections 
on regulations and volunteer efforts from 1945 to 1947 respectively examine the camp’s 
busiest period and one in which German refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe 
were the most significant population group in the camp. The first section discusses 
processing procedures and citizenship at Friedland, while the second part considers how 
volunteer efforts at Friedland contributed to social normalization in the surrounding 
community. The third section of this paper analyzes fears of rising criminality and the 
establishment of a sub-camp for male youths in 1947. A disputed transfer of German 
resettlers (Aussiedler) from Poland in 1950 is the topic of the fourth section. Resettlers 
were the single largest group processed in the camp after 1950, and the dispute also 
underlines the geopolitical aspects of Friedland’s mission to provide aid and order along 
the West German border. The final section considers the 1955 return of prisoners of war 
from the Soviet Union, suggesting that both German and international press reports’ 
                                                 
15
 She argues that occupying power’s behavior “obviously followed the ‘climate’ of high politics and in 
most instances can be seen as a reflection of the ‘normalizing’ relationships between victors and 
vanquished,” though it is worth more closely examining these relationships, which did not necessarily 
exhibit a process of inexorable normalization. Kleineke, “Entstehung und Entwicklung des Lagers 
Friedland 1945-1955,” 3. 
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ambivalence about the returnees drew upon earlier uneasiness about individuals within 
the camp.
   
 
  
CHAPTER 2 
 
DELOUSING ALONG THE ROAD TO CITIZENSHIP 
 
 
On 5 October 1945 the governor of the Hanover province enacted a series of 
requirements for refugees seeking housing. Released in an informational flyer, the 
directives required refugees near Hanover to pass through one of the nine transit camps in 
the region. Only after processing would an individual receive the registration card 
necessary for procuring provisions. The registration cards also contained a city 
assignment from the British military government, and the instructions obliged refugees to 
have their cards stamped at the railroad station and at the assigned place of residence. 
Having completed these steps, an individual could exchange his or her registration card 
for a rations card that was valid only for the appropriate district. Further moving from 
city to city was “forbidden by orders of the military government.”16 
 These directives evince German and British authorities’ attempts to impose order 
on the arrival of refugees and expellees. In contrast to the “wild expulsions” of Germans 
from Poland and Czechoslovakia, the resettling of expellees was to proceed in a strictly-
regulated manner. In return for distributing food and supplies, authorities could begin the 
process of sorting individuals and compiling information about new residents. As 
locations of first administrative contact between refugees or expellees and the 
government, transit camps such as Friedland played an important role in the collection of 
                                                 
16
 “Merkblatt für Flüchtlinge” in Gückel, 60 Jahre Lager Friedland, 13. 
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personal information through reports and reconfirmation of individual legal identities.17 
The Friedland facility offered a means by which authorities could collect individuals and 
direct them to the cities and towns most capable of accommodating them, while 
processing also established individuals’ legal identities as persons who might eventually 
be compensated for their suffering through a program of war burdens equalization. As 
such, the social bookkeeping element of camp operation provided the crucial registration 
and individual recognition on which welfare entitlements rested. 
 An examination of processing procedures at Friedland reveals the significant 
extent to which camp authorities relied on coercion to address what would otherwise be a 
chaotic situation during mass arrivals.18 Issued shortly after the camp became operational, 
Camp Order Number 1 of 26 September 1945 enumerated a procedure for camp 
personnel and arriving persons to follow.19 After the arrival and unloading of trucks, 
personnel sent individuals to register in tents. Only once a registration card had been 
obtained could persons procure their ration cards and have them stamped. Delousing and 
a further stamp as proof came next, and this stamp was required for obtaining food or 
clothing. Individuals then waited until called for a departure overseen by British soldiers. 
Camp personnel handed out tickets for the day of travel to assigned destinations, and 
processed persons could reclaim what possessions they had brought. In all, “the 
                                                 
17
 For examples of the reports, see “Brigitte Prigannt – 29.1.48” and “Udwari, Franziska – 31.1.48” in the 
Friedland Chronik 1945-1965.  
    The identification of individuals and collection of personal information again relates to the sociological 
literature that sees camps as a space to categorize individuals within an inside/outside social dichotomy, 
which helps to organize the tripartite relations between camp inhabitants, the host society, and the state. See 
Diken and Laustsen, 10. 
 
18
 Here one sees an antecedent of current practice in refugee camps, which according to Jennifer Hyndman 
rely on coercion to fulfill their missions. See Hyndman, Managing Displacement:Refugees and the Politics 
of Humanitarianism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 120-41. 
 
19
 See Kleinecke, “Das Grenzdurchgangslager Friedland,” 154. 
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registration, medical examination, and disinfecting as well as questioning by the British 
security services took about 15 minutes.”20 
The speed of this processing procedure points to the efficiency with which the 
camp operated. The typical stay in Friedland lasted between 2 and 7 days, though the 
wait for a housing assignment sometimes took longer.21 This brevity was surely the result 
of the need to quickly process thousands of individuals. Logistics prevented the Friedland 
camp from housing residents for extended periods, and the dedicated sub-camp meant for 
longer stays (the Wohnlager) typically held no more than 250 persons who fit specific 
criteria for extended residence based upon their place of origin and lack of contacts 
within the British zone. 22 After all, if a significant percentage of the 1.13 million 
refugees and expellees from 1945 to 1947 had lived in the camp on a permanent basis, 
then the facility’s population would have dwarfed the small town of Friedland and the 
nearby city of Göttingen.23 
Another crucial observation about processing at the Friedland camp is the 
pervasiveness of stamps, permits, and registration cards. These administrative tools 
functioned as the key distribution mechanism in a system of food and housing rationing, 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. 
 
21
 “Grenzdurchgangslager Friedland 1945-2005," 8. 
 
22
 For statistics on the Wohnlager and detailed discussion of categorization criteria, see Kleineke, 
“Entstehung und Entwicklung des Lagers Friedland,” 181-85. There, however, has been no significant 
scholarly examination of social life in the Wohnlager, which is unfortunate because Atina Grossmann has 
documented an institutionalizing and inertial effect Displaced Persons camps had on their residents that 
may have also been the case in Friedland. See Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 180-84, 260-62. 
 
23
 Here it is worth mentioning that in contrast to other instances of mass population displacement, the 
phenomenon of tent cities did not exist on a significant scale. A combination of factors in the German 
situation contributed to this result: there was no possibility of return for the displaced individuals in 
addition to the existence of an urgency to quickly distribute individuals in cities and the countryside, 
thereby preventing collective action. 
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not only in the camp itself but also throughout occupied Germany. The shockingly low 
food rations of 860 calories per day for “normal” consumers in 1945 might be the most 
commonly cited form of rationing, but there was also tight control over housing.24 
Germany had lost roughly 4 million units of housing due to the war, amounting to 25 
percent of its 1939 housing stock, while cities with populations over a quarter million had 
on average lost 45 percent of their capacity.25 The Friedland facility’s ability to quickly 
feed and find housing assignments for individuals speaks not only to the efficiency of the 
camp’s processing procedures, but also to the strength of the ration regime. Efficient 
camp operation prevented the facility from becoming a bottleneck for incoming masses, 
but local governments enabled this fast processing by rationing housing space in their 
own jurisdictions.26 Local authorities’ ability to compel residents to share homes with 
expellees should therefore not be forgotten. Nor should one overlook the importance of 
expellee status, as could be proven through registration at Friedland, for claiming 
subsidies for construction of new settlements, which eventually lifted tensions by ending 
shared housing and offering expellees an investment in their new homeland.27 
The desire to create legal identities through processing at the camp thus 
anticipated the need for papers when individuals arrived at their new homes and 
registered with the local government in accordance with both the need to maintain rolls 
                                                 
24
 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 21. 
 
25
 Jeffry Diefendorf, “America and the Rebuilding of Germany” in American Policy and the Reconstruction 
of Germany, 1945-1955, ed. Jeffry Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Hermann-Josef Rupierer (Washington DC: 
German Historical Institute, 1993), 348. 
 
26
 Andreas Brundiers, “Neues Heim - neue Heimat? Zur Funktion des sozialen Wohnungsbaus bei der 
Integration von Flüchtlingen und Vertriebenen am Beispiel der Siedlung Vorwerk," in Zwischen Heimat 
und Zuhause: Deutsche Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in (West-) Deutschland 1945-200, ed. Rainer Schulze, 
Rainhard Rohde and Rainer Voss (Osnabrück: Secolo Verlag, 2001), 57-74. 
 
27
 Ibid. 
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for rationing and the German legal tradition of documented residency. Whether camp-
established identities bore any relation to an individual’s prewar and wartime identity was 
another question. For expellees forced to leave with few possessions and no 
documentation, registering at the camp and reentering government rolls could offer a sort 
of rebirth. Dispossession and the need to reclaim a legal identity presented individuals 
with an opportunity to reinvent themselves, which could prove problematic for the 
sorting process. Historian Joseph Schechtman argued that the difficulty of verifying 
expellee claims about their former lives created bitterness in “Nazi or near-Nazi circles” 
towards expellees who were safe because they arrived “without their past, for it was 
difficult to muster the evidence necessary to indict them.”28 
Reports from David Sainty, the British volunteer at Friedland, provide 
confirmation that the accuracy of these new legal identities depended on the registrant’s 
honesty in the absence of resources to confirm what they claimed. Sainty’s frustrations 
with the process, however, did not stem from fears or jealousies (as Schechtman 
discussed) that Nazi expellees might escape trial, but instead from his belief that the 
identification process inhibited volunteers’ efforts to aid expellees. As such, he inveighed 
against time spent “stamping papers of all conceivable kinds. Wasted because it is 
impossible to check.”29 
Even if there were significant problems with ensuring the truthfulness of 
registrants’ identities, the process of stamping papers and generating rolls nonetheless 
represented an important attempt to reestablish the bureaucratic order necessary for 
                                                 
28
 Schechtman, 322. One area for future research concerns the confirmation of claimed identities, such as 
through testimonies from fellow refugees and expellees. 
 
29
 “Report 31,” 26 November 1945, B 45 11 26 – 1 01, ASCI. 
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efficient distribution of aid in the future. In addition to the humanitarian goal of reuniting 
families torn apart by war, search services for missing persons could help to clarify legal 
statuses for property claims or remarriage as well as ease the state’s burden of providing 
for individuals by quickly placing them with relatives who could care for them. This 
process of registration was also important because individuals left Friedland with their 
citizenship and claims to welfare entitlements secured. In fact, once the government 
recognized an expellee, the law guaranteed citizenship to him or her regardless of place 
of birth, as the standard of jus sanguinis first encoded by the 1913 Imperial and State 
Citizenship Act remained in effect after the war. This standard of German ethnicity 
would then become integrated into the West German Basic Law in 1949.30 
The confirmation of refugee and expellee citizenship then extended entitlement 
rights to the individuals processed at Friedland. In particular, groups disproportionately 
affected by the war, such as refugees and expellees, would be compensated through an 
equalization of burdens (Lastenausgleich). Michael Hughes has shown that discussions of 
financial burden sharing had begun in Germany during the war and was a significant 
issue during the postwar period, in part because fears that the status quo of an inequitable 
distribution of the war’s costs would lead to political instability.31 Although it had not 
                                                 
30
 Article 116 of the Basic Law assures the right of return based upon an individual’s ethnicity, or 
“deutsche Volkszugehörigkeit.” Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, "The Decline of Privilege " in 
Coming Home to Germany?, ed. David Rock and Stefan Wolff (New York, 2002), 102-06. Von 
Koppenfels contends the decision to retain the Wilhelmine-era basis for citizenship in the Federal Republic 
reflected Cold War desires to protest Eastern European discrimination of Germans and to implicitly 
undercut East German legitimacy by underlining the decision to not formally recognize the German 
Democratic Republic. 
   It should, however, be noted that Dieter Gosewinkel has contested the historical focus on jus sanguinis as 
necessarily defining citizneship in ethnic terms up to the 1930s. See Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und 
Ausschließen: Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001). 
 
31
 Michael L. Hughes, Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1999). 
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been initially clear how a program of burden sharing would proceed, both Germans and 
the Western occupation powers recognized a need to include the individuals streaming 
through camps such as Friedland.32  
An examination of the Friedland facility’s processing procedures and social 
bookkeeping functions thus reveals important overlaps between the imperative to provide 
humanitarian aid and the desire to reestablish order. First, the humanitarian need and 
desire to care for the dispossessed masses passing through Friedland relied on preexisting 
rationing structures. Second, occupation authorities at Friedland could create manageable 
spaces by diverting streams of destitute refugees away from cities unable to support them 
and by creating a register of persons whom the government might have otherwise lost 
track of in the aftermath of war and expulsions. A third and related observation is that 
such registration would later provide a basis for the extension of welfare benefits to help 
expellees materially, prevent radicalization due to poverty, and offer expellees an 
investment in rebuilding the German state that would subsequently be their new home. 
                                                 
32
 This is not to suggest that the Lastenausgleich was a forgone conclusion or that it necessarily had wide-
ranging material benefits for claimants. Hughes argues that it was a “hard-won compromise” reflecting 
political and economic realities in the FRG; see Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat, 194. In fact, it had not 
been clear that an equalization would proceed along native/expellee lines; cf. Reinhold Schillinger, Der 
Entscheidungsprozess beim Lastenausgleich, 1945-1952 (St. Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, 1985), 
289-97, and Andreas Kossert, Kalte Heimat (Munich: Siedler, 2008), 96. Actual restitution was often 
piecemeal and difficult to obtain, as argued by Carl-Jochen Müller, Praxis und Probleme des 
Lastenausgleichs in Mannheim, 1949-1959 (Mannheim: Südwestdeutsche Schriften, 1997), 375-80, and 
Daniel Levy, "Integrating Ethnic Germans in West Germany” in Coming Home to Germany? ed. David 
Rock and Stefan Wolff (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002). 
   
 
  
CHAPTER 3 
 
REBUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
 
From its inception the Friedland camp relied heavily upon charitable 
organizations for staffing, food, and clothing. Indeed, the fact that the camp was first 
located on land donated by the University of Göttingen underscores the importance of 
charity to the camp’s history. Histories of the facility generally discuss the Red Cross, 
which worked alongside German religious organizations, the Catholic Caritas and 
Protestant Innere Mission / Evangelische Hilfswerk.33 This historiography on charities 
has focused narrowly on these three organizations because of their size and length of 
service, but less well-known organizations that also played a role in the camp’s crucial 
early years have been ignored. Examination of efforts by one such group, a British 
chapter of the Service Civil International (SCI),34 shows how volunteer work at the camp 
helped the reconstitution of civil society in nearby Göttingen as well as fostered goodwill 
and a collaborative relationship between Germans and the British. 
 In November 1945 David Sainty and other British SCI volunteers arrived in 
Friedland. While the rest of the group helped to set up Nissen huts at the camp and assist 
in transporting arriving persons from the Soviet-British border, much of the Sainty’s 
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effort centered on attracting German volunteers to Friedland. Having met with 
representatives from Caritas and Innere Mission and seen their attempts to raise 
volunteers at the start of December, Sainty suggested organizing students from the 
university in Göttingen.35 He proceeded to discuss volunteer work with a “professor’s 
wife who runs the student ‘Hilfswerke’ and the student head of this” sometime in the 
following week.36 Sainty does not identify the student head of the organization, but it 
seems likely he had spoken with Joachim Frege, a law student living in the town of 
Friedland who had already begun organizing friends to help on the weekends.37 
 The coordination between the Sainty and the student groups led to the distribution 
of a flyer and printing of a newspaper article later in December that called upon students 
to help. The flyer proposed that students could look after children, the elderly, and the 
sick. It also argued, “the Göttingen student body must…regard helpfully joining in as its 
foremost task.”38 Paul Stein, a fellow law student of Frege’s and a member in the student 
group “Die Gleichen,”39 wrote an article for the university newspaper about service at 
Friedland. After describing the difficult conditions facing expellees and refugees, Stein 
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tried to rally students to their aid: “Opportunities to help? Hundredfold. We push and pull 
the carts, repair broken vehicles, carry luggage, sacks, trunks, boxes, give advice, in 
short, we are ready to help in any capacity [wir sind Mädchen für alles].”40 
 One of the striking aspects of these documents is the extant level of local 
organization in what has otherwise been characterized as a society split asunder. The 
early coordinating efforts by Sainty in 1945 relied upon already existing semi-formal and 
formal social networks, such as Frege’s law student friends or the association “Die 
Gleichen.” University newspapers printed with British approval, student groups, and 
religious volunteers at the camps therefore point to a significant level of social 
organization and normalizing interactions in the “society of collapse,” or 
Zusammenbruchsgesellschaft.41 Indeed, by the end of February 1946, Frege was co-
responsible for coordinating a month-long effort by the SCI and the General Students’ 
Committee (Allgemeiner Studententausschuß) that included 36 students, a German relief 
worker, and two British relief workers. From February 25 to March 26, 1946, the SCI and 
Frege’s group completed tasks including: assembling Nissen huts with wooden floors, the 
removal and transport of barracks for their reconstruction, the erection of porch roofs and 
a fence, snow removal, the cleaning of drainage ditches and pipes, and the transport and 
loading of refugees’ luggage.42 
 The other issue of postwar social relations raised by the SCI documents is how 
collaboration between British and German groups could accelerate a process of 
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reconciliation. In his recollections about helping at Friedland, Frege emphasized, “the 
trusting collaboration of former war foes in the Friedland camp only seven months after 
the end of a very hard war was a decisive experience.”43 Stein likewise reported that 
“evening discussions were conducive to mutual understanding” between members of the 
SCI and Die Gleichen.44 Although the two groups had a different “ideological outlook” 
(Ideenrichtung), Stein felt that the combined British and German efforts to relieve the 
hardships at Friedland “yielded a good synthesis.”45 Of course, interactions between 
Germans and the British could be difficult as well. The relationship between German 
volunteers and British soldiers, for instance, was “very complicated and not self-evident” 
because of rules against fraternization.46 What Sainty and his fellow civilian volunteers 
could provide, then, was a way to bridge a gap in social interaction between Germans and 
the military occupiers. 
The British and German accounts of voluntary service at Friedland during the 
winter and spring of 1945/46 thus offer several conclusions. First, and not to be 
overlooked in light of recent literature stressing the cold reception expellees faced in 
Germany,47 British and German volunteers eagerly helped to care for refugees and 
expellees entering the British zone and in doing so provided much needed personnel for 
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the camp. Expellees with high expectations may have been disappointed by the 
sometimes-strained relations with local populations, but their very entrance to the British 
zone had partly depended upon the efforts of local volunteers. Second, the SCI efforts at 
Friedland relied upon and helped to cement the newly developing civil associations at 
Göttingen’s university. Finally, the cooperation between the SCI and university student 
associations helped to engender goodwill by introducing Germans to the British as 
friends and partners in the rebuilding process rather than solely as occupiers. 
   
 
  
CHAPTER 4 
 
CRIME AND THE FRIEDLAND YOUTH CAMP 
 
 
 In March 1948 a 77-year-old man was brutally beaten and robbed when he tried to 
cross from Soviet-controlled Thuringia into British-controlled Lower Saxony. A local 
paper in Göttingen reported the incident in an article entitled “With Clubs and Pistols.”48 
According to police, the brothers Hahn had escorted the elderly man to the town of 
Friedland where they beat him senseless with a club and then stole a suitcase full of 
clothes. This was not an isolated incident, but rather represented a violent culmination of 
criminal activity as reported in a series of articles run by the Abendpost that centered on 
the Friedland camp. In its tabloid reporting, the Abendpost had already warned border 
crossers of thieves offering to carry their luggage, and it had noted the confiscation of 25 
kilograms of rapeseed and 8 bottles of alcohol from smugglers in Friedland.49 The 
Abendpost had also printed a lengthy investigative report on police attempts to stop 
smugglers and win the trust of “harmless border crossers.”50 In fact, a retrospective 
account published a few years later included this alarmist description of the situation: 
“Murderers walk about in the immediate vicinity of the camp. The border has become 
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dangerous. Bandits descend upon women, steal their suitcases, rip cloths from the bodies 
of the defenseless, [and] take everything that can be taken.”51 
In contrast to the regimented environment British military and German civilian 
administrators tried to establish at Friedland, the British-Soviet border remained a site of 
continuing disorder. Indeed, by concentrating the influx of impoverished refugees, the 
camp contributed to perceptions of increasing criminality, while the camp and border 
became physical spaces onto which locals could project their fears.52 Documents from 
1947 and 1948 make clear the administrators’ increasing unease with the disorderly 
conditions. In this context, the 1947 development at Friedland of a separate camp for 
male adolescents demonstrates a response by authorities to fears that unruliness would 
eventually lead to more violent crime along the border. 
 In March 1947 an unknown camp administrator wrote to Walter Müller-
Bringmann, then a contact in the Hanover press.53 The administrator discussed the 
recently constructed youth camp designed to hold approximately 40 males up to 18 years 
of age. Trying to emphasize the gravity of problem presented by unruly youths processed 
by the camp, he included a copy of a letter found on the teenaged Georg Heubaum when 
he tried to cross the border. The letter contained instructions written by his older brother 
                                                 
51
 Müller-Bringmann, Das Buch von Friedland, 71-72. Given the diary-like nature of Müller-Bringmann’s 
1956 retrospective account of the camp, it can be difficult to determine when an individual entry was 
written, and thus whether it was a contemporary description or instead reflected an emergent narrative 
consensus about that period in the camp’s history. Nevertheless, the description is worth including because 
it does reflect the dominant narrative for that moment in the camp’s history, which itself was based upon 
the perceptions of increased criminality, as demonstrated (if not created by) local press accounts. 
 
52
 It is telling, for instance, that the “Mit Knüppeln und Pistolen” article in the Abendpost began with a 
crime report from Friedland before moving onto news of a potentially more serious robbery in Göttingen 
by a pistol-wielding individual. 
 
53
 “The/Mü, An die Hannover’sche Presse,” 20.3.1947, Friedland Chronik: 1945-1965. Müller-Bringmann 
would, of course, later publish his diary-like retrospective of the Friedland camp’s history in 1956, which 
represents the first of the commemorative camp histories and included the previously cited description of 
the local crime wave. 
    
     22 
Karl for traveling to live with him in the Ruhr industrial region. Karl instructed his 
brother to procure the false documents that eventually aroused suspicion at Friedland and 
led to the letter’s confiscation: “Try to change your birth date so that you are already 18,” 
and a friend might be able to “arrange a little paper for you.”54 If questioned about his 
papers, Georg was supposed to lie about having fled from a prisoner transport to the 
Soviet Union under the presumption that disproving such a claim would be difficult at 
best. Moreover, Karl’s request that Georg bring significant quantities of stationary, 
envelopes, oxidized silver, cigarettes and cigarette paper, lighter fluid, and alcohol 
indicated that Georg was to serve as a courier for Karl’s flourishing black market trade. 
Although Karl asked Georg to borrow 140 Reichsmarks from his mother to finance the 
trip, he assured Georg that there was plenty of money to be made, “because I am cutting 
big deals in the coming days and weeks.”55 
 For the camp administrator, this letter presented the quintessential example of the 
need for intervention in lives of youths separated from their parents. He argued, “The 
hardships of today’s youth become obvious in the attached letter…it is clear that youths 
in most cases, as was the case here, are led astray by older people.”56 The author feared 
that if authorities failed to adequately address unruly youths, then criminality would 
become a much greater problem later. The youth camp would redirect Georg to “an 
orderly profession and family,” but an implicit concern was how many other individuals 
might already have received “instructions for the start of a criminal career.”57 
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 To a certain extent the worries about youth criminality addressed at Friedland 
were part of a larger set of problems concerning youth in postwar Germany. Kimberly 
Redding, for instance, has found that many Berliners considered the years 1944 to 1947 
as “lovely childhood years” (schöne Kinderjahre) with unprecedented freedom from 
adult authority figures, and this freedom then led to adult concerns that “young Berliners 
would resort to a life of crime.”58 Redding further argues that youths engaged in black 
market trade thought little of debates over “young lawbreakers as both products and 
perpetuators of immorality and lawlessness,” but instead focused on the immediate 
concern of “meeting their personal needs without getting caught.”59 This difference in 
perceptions of criminality based upon age – what to adults seemed a sign of immorality 
was just a means of getting by in the minds of youths – was also likely the case for Georg 
Heubaum, who may well have seen smuggling as a means to get to the Ruhr region and 
support himself there until he could find work. 
 The level of coercion at Friedland as well as differences in gendered perceptions 
of disorderly youths, however, illustrate how local circumstances produced a situation at 
Friedland different from Berlin. According to Redding, normalization in Berlin entailed 
“opportunities to resume or finally begin educational and professional paths upset by the 
war and its aftermath.”60 An article from Die Welt spoke in a similar language of 
normalization and professionalization at the Friedland facility, but it also suggests that 
the youth camp operated more coercively by detaining youths. The article focused on the 
directionless lives led by many youths who had “roamed about for months without a 
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stable home in Germany.”61 Their wandering came to an end under police detention and 
transfer to Friedland. Now appropriately supervised, the youths could return to lives that 
were more normal in terms of schooling and supervision, even if the camp location belied 
traditional upbringing in a home. This coercive attempt to bring order into youths’ lives 
benefitted both the youths and broader society, and the article’s author characterized their 
arrival at the Friedland camp as “the start of a new life for many, many thousands.”62 By 
emphasizing the start of new lives absent any apparent bad influences, the article could 
therefore reassure readers that German and British authorities were taking a proactive and 
effective approach to the issue of perceived adolescent criminality. 
A close reading of the house rules (Hausordnung) for the youth camp underscores 
the tight control of youths in the camp and how new lives for adolescent males would be 
based upon productivity and order.63 To begin with, the youth camp administrators 
required residents to work within the camp or for farmers or artisans in the surrounding 
area. A portion of their earnings was withheld to pay for room and board, while further 
withholdings were placed in individual savings accounts to be accessed once residents 
moved out of the camp. The residents kept what remained of their earnings as pocket 
money, though any buying or selling of items within the camp was strictly forbidden in 
the apparent effort to prevent the development of a black market. The decision to seal off 
residents in the youth camp from the general camp population stemmed from 
apprehension about the larger camp as a “moral danger zone,” thereby justifying a 
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separate youth camp as a means to guard against future criminality.64 Smoking and 
disorderly behavior were strictly forbidden, and the weekly schedule that developed 
theoretically left little idle time for the youths other than after Sunday church service. 
While housing and feeding youths was meant to relieve pressures driving them to 
participate in the black market or other criminal activities, there was more at work in 
these rules. By reorienting youths through education and apprenticeships, camp 
administrators could help to construct new social networks that would help to guard 
against future unruliness or criminality, while savings accounts and newly acquired skills 
presumably offered an early investment in the start of a respectable career. 
The two interrelated silences regarding women and youths’ sexual activities stand 
out from these documents and further suggest that concerns about minors were dictated 
by local circumstances at Friedland. Whereas Berlin authorities’ concerns about girls play 
a significant role in Redding’s study, the camp administration at Friedland evidently did 
not worry about unaccompanied female minors. Regarding discussions of femininity, 
what one finds is comments on the need for a “feminine element” (weiblichen Element) 
for the socialization of boys in the youth sub-camp, and there was evidently much 
frustration in trying to find a suitable, female teacher for them.65 
It is therefore worth asking why the camp administrators’ worries about 
criminality were male-coded and why there was no analogous effort to establish a sub-
camp for girls. Much of the answer must stem from the fact that violent crime near the 
camp solely involved male perpetrators, as indicated by suspects’ names in news reports 
at the time. Still, camp officials and the local press evidently did not fret over female 
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youths growing into unruly or criminal lives in the same way they worried about male 
youths, even though women were surely involved in black market trade in the camp and 
newspaper reports mentioned women among the illegal border-crossers. What is certain 
is that the camp sent orphaned or otherwise unaccompanied female youths to a home in 
Göttingen. One might therefore speculate that administrators did not feel the camp was 
the proper site to house such girls. Alternatively, the existence of the home in Göttingen 
perhaps offered administrators an expedient with which they could reduce demands on 
camp resources by putting female youths out of sight and out of mind. 
The absence of concerns about youths’ sexual activity is a further important 
difference between documents about Friedland and what Redding identified in Berlin. 
Specifically, the specter of “depraved girls” that stemmed from rape and a perceived 
surplus of women found no expression at Friedland though it was common in Berlin.66 
Nor does one find discussion of male sexuality among the minors in Friedland’s youth 
camp. To a certain extent, this silence on sexual matters is unsurprising given that church 
organizations ran the youth camp. Another explanation, albeit tentative and necessarily 
unsupported by documentary evidence, is that the lack of discussion or worry stemmed 
from an assumption that there would be no sexual activity. There were no women in the 
youth camp and the male youths housed there supposedly had no contact with the main 
camp’s residents. Given the apparent lack of opportunity for sexual relationships, the 
youth camp’s administration may have seen no need to discuss such matters. Still, it 
worth noting the irony that in a setting meant to promote the normalization of youths and 
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prepare them for future lives beyond the camp, there was no discussion of male-female 
relationships assumed to form the basis of stable, normally-functioning society.67 
When the Friedland youth camp was founded in 1947 it offered authorities an 
opportunity to better control the disorderly lives of youths passing into the British zone 
who lacked parental supervision. The decision to create the camp where one could begin 
a process of normalizing the youths’ lives also seems to have been affected by 
perceptions of rising criminality centered on Friedland, for by providing oversight, 
discipline, and education, these youths would be reoriented toward a path of orderly 
respectability rather than eventually replacing the current generation of criminals 
operating near the border. The ongoing operation of the youth camp for several years 
even after worries of criminality died down with the closure of the border in 1948 
suggests that authorities continued to see the youth camp as a useful space for intervening 
in the lives of a subset of Germany’s youth and fostering the development of men 
specifically who could late contribute to an orderly German society. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF HUMANITARIANISM 
 
 
On 3 March 1950, a standoff developed along the Thuringian-Lower Saxon 
border between Russian authorities, British soldiers, and West German customs officials. 
At issue were hundreds of resettlers from Poland whose names did not appear on official 
resettlement lists for the agreed-upon population transfer codenamed “Operation Link.”68 
About seven hundred resettlers waited in the cold for transfer to Friedland while a British 
officer met with his Russian counterparts and border officials tried to determine their 
instructions. Eventually Lower Saxon Minister for Refugees Heinrich Albertz declared to 
the press: “Gentlemen, the explanation I have to give is short. General Robertson has 
refused to accept the transport.”69 
 This standoff was a power politics confrontation between East and West played 
out on German soil, but it also provides a window onto conflict between West Germans 
and the British over the relative importance of economic stability in calculating 
humanitarian responses. For the British, the situation represented an attempt by Polish 
Communists, perhaps in cooperation with East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet 
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Union to displace the recovering West German economy by flooding it with a new wave 
of German expellees. In this line of reasoning, the acceptance of tens if not hundreds of 
thousands more ethnic Germans without the capacity to care for them or provide housing 
and work could hardly be considered humanitarian. German politicians and press, 
however, saw the situation in extraordinarily different terms. Examination of German 
responses will demonstrate that they no longer focused on the destabilizing effects of 
population transfer, which had been the dominant paradigm for such transfers and which 
still affected Anglo-American attitudes. Instead, the West German discourse focused on 
rescuing victims of communism, even at a point when the number of transferred persons 
threatened to make their absorption difficult. 
Diplomatic communiqués between Britain, the United States, and Poland help to 
clarify the buildup to the events on March 3. In November and December 1949, the 
Allied High Commission for Germany approved an agreement between the Federal 
Republic and Poland for the transfer of 25,000 Germans who still lived in Poland, but 
who had relatives in Federal Republic. Once the agreement had been made, according to 
the British ambassador to Poland, the High Commission received no further word until 
information “reached the Land Authorities in Hesse and Lower Saxony simultaneously 
that a first train bringing refugees from Poland would arrive on the border of the Federal 
Republic on 3rd or 4th of March and that it was intended that a similar train should arrive 
at each of two border points every four days for the remainder of the year.”70 A 
calculation based on the number of registered and unregistered resettlers, the train’s 
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capacity, and the supposed frequency of arriving transports led to British fears that as 
many as 180,000 resettlers might arrive over the course of the year.71 
 In their protests to Poland, the Western powers engaged a language of 
humanitarianism to strengthen their position. The British complained that any such mass 
transfer “would be both arbitrary and inhumane,” while emphasizing that their initial 
agreement to a transfer of 25,000 individuals had been a “humanitarian concession.”72 In 
addition to explicit claims that the British had fulfilled their obligations under the 
Potsdam Agreement, such language of arbitrary and inhumane transfers made an implicit 
case for the illegality of further transfers under the principles set forth at Potsdam. The 
American protest likewise noted that the acceptance of the original 25,000 had been only 
undertaken as an “exception on humanitarian and compassionate grounds,” and the entry 
of individuals on that list could still occur “as an extra-ordinary and humanitarian move.73 
Both documents made clear that the border would be shut for any additional resettlers. 
 While the standoff continued at Friedland, articles in the British press focused on 
the High Commission’s fear for German economic stability if masses of resettlers began 
to move through Friedland. An article in the Times of London suggested that the transfer 
was part of a larger Eastern Bloc effort to “embarrass the west German economy by 
adding to the number who have to be fed and supported.”74 The Manchester Guardian 
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reported on March 7 that the British government regarded the Polish government’s 
actions as “a deliberate attempt to undermine the economy of the Western zones.”75 
 German newspaper coverage of the ongoing dispute, however, makes clear that 
the opinions of the German authorities and press diverged significantly from the High 
Commission. Robertson’s order had been predicated on fears of disorder and economic 
difficulties associated with the previous waves of expulsion. Moreover, British and 
American appeals to humanitarianism alternated between legalistic references to the 
Potsdam Agreement and short-sighted complaints about the inhumanity of forcing 
resettlers upon an unprepared Federal Republic even as the transports faced indefinite 
waits along the border. The West German government and press, on the other hand, 
valued a perceived responsibility to their fellow nationals that outweighed concerns over 
economic stability. In particular, German newspapers published stories meant to evoke 
sympathy from their readership, and government officials described the crisis in terms of 
a humanitarian duty to fellow Germans.76  
 Two articles published respectively by Hanover and Göttingen newspapers typify 
sympathetic portrayals of the refused resettlers. In a report published on March 4, the 
Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung described the situation on the border and why the 
British had refused entry despite their role in negotiating the population transfer in the 
first place. The report’s final paragraph discussed the hardships the group had faced 
during the intervening years. Most had come from a camp in Leszno near Poznań, where 
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“they had been sent to work for farmers without reimbursement since 1947.”77 It went on 
to note, “an older resettler suffered a heart attack when the transport assembled behind 
the Soviet sentry gate.”78 Childhood innocence and deprivation under the Polish 
Communists also played prominent roles. Children had not been allowed to learn 
German, and the article recounted the common story of a journalist who gave oranges to 
the arriving children. In return for the fruit, the children thanked him “for the nice, 
colorful potatoes.”79 
 A few days later, the Göttinger Tageblatt published a profile of the Büttner family 
who had been fortunate to cross the border. The article explained that the family’s 
triumphant entry into West Germany largely resulted from their comparatively good 
financial situation in Poland. When they reached the border, the family had the 
appropriate entry visa from the High Commission offices in Warsaw, but procuring the 
visa had been difficult. The author wrote sardonically, “Any German living in Poland 
could have this paper, if he had the money to repeatedly travel to Warsaw and to pay for 
the countless certificates and finally the fee of 800 zloty for the permit.”80 The article 
went on to celebrate Josef Büttner’s “sharpness” (Pfiffigkeit) in obtaining the necessary 
documents for his family, but it also lamented the slow process of sorting through the list 
of remaining persons. German bureaucrats were not at fault for the delay, as the author 
praised the sixteen customs officials who were working “feverishly” to produce an 
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alphabetical list of authorized resettlers. Rather, fault lay with the Polish offices that had 
handed over an “arbitrarily” organized list.81 
 Lower Saxon Refugee Minister Heinrich Albertz became a fixture in the German 
press and de facto spokesperson for accepting all individuals from the incoming 
transports. In contrast to the British, Albertz favored a more embracing humanitarianism 
that likely stemmed from his previous training as a pastor and which was defined by a 
German obligation to care for this new wave of their ethnic brethren.82 Articles often 
included statements from him that made clear his displeasure with Robertson’s 
interdiction and his opinion that West Germans had a duty to come to their ethnic 
counterparts’ aid. A report of the first day’s standoff in the Essener Tageblatt featured 
Albertz, who beseeched the English border officer to allow the waiting group through. 
The article let the officer’s response speak for itself: “‘No,’ said the intimidated guard, 
‘that won’t do. I have my orders…’”83 That day Albertz was also reputed to have 
remarked, “Ask General Robertson if he wants to treat human beings in the same way as 
the Russians treat goods.”84 A week later Albertz wrote to Die Welt and again decried the 
instructions from the High Commission that weighed on the “backs of the weakest, and 
divest people coming from terrible suffering of their last dignity.”85 
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At the end of March Albertz resumed his attacks on the British. He claimed, 
“what is grotesque about the Allied attitude is that those who signed the Potsdam 
Agreement without batting an eyelash and tolerated the expulsion of millions now in the 
last phase raise their objections.”86 Albertz further argued that the incoming transports 
had nothing to do with mass expulsions from Poland, but rather consisted of German 
nationals who had worked for years to secure their transfer to West Germany. Finally, 
according to a report, “The Minister turned against the allied argumentation that the 
Polish side intended to ‘burst the West German economy’ through this resettlement.”87 
For Albertz, and the press that uncritically reported his condemnations of the British, 
there was no question that West Germany needed to accept resettlers as prescribed by 
Basic Law and irrespective of economic considerations. 
 Despite Allied High Commission fears of March 1950, Poland never flooded 
West Germany with impoverished expellees. It remains unclear whether the Polish 
government had actually planned a mass expulsion or if the Allied High Commission had 
misread their intentions, but the crisis was quietly defused by middle-to-late May.88 As 
such, the Friedland facility ultimately processed some 35,000 resettlers rather than the 
agreed-upon 25,000 in 1950. The Friedland transit camp at the center of this dispute 
received a great deal of international attention, and a comment by Albertz suggests the 
episode might have played out differently were it not for the facility. Speaking about the 
impracticality of High Commission demands, Albertz suggested that resettlers would 
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simply “be funneled across the border illegally,”89 and the matter of factness of his 
comment points to an apparent belief that such an informal acceptance could be 
accomplished without much public tribulation. One therefore wonders if the Friedland 
camp might not have contributed to the apparent crisis in a manner similar to the worries 
about crime several years earlier. It did so by providing a physical space in which 
impoverished resettlers and fears of them were concentrated rather than being dealt with 
diffusely along the border between the two German states. 
                                                 
89
 “Large-Scale Expulsions from Poland,” Manchester Guardian, 7 March 1950. 
   
 
  
CHAPTER 6 
 
THE AMBIVALENCE OF PRISONER HOMECOMINGS 
 
 
 The Friedland transit camp experienced emotional high points with the return of 
German soldiers and civilians (Heimkehrer) from Eastern European and Soviet prisons in 
February 1954 and October 1955. As the facility’s first decade of operation came to a 
close, these Heimkehrer transports brought major political figures to celebrate the camp. 
Speaking to over 1,000 Heimkehrer at Friedland on 28 February 1954, Federal 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer promised, “The federal government will not relax and not 
rest until the last German woman and man has returned home.”90 Federal President 
Theodor Heuss was on hand in October 1955 to offer a “hearty welcome” to some of the 
10,000 Heimkehrer returning from Soviet prisons, including approximately 200 
generals.91 
 Historians of the postwar period in West Germany have recognized these 
Heimkehrer returns, and particularly the one in October 1955, as important moments for 
the developing state. Robert Moeller has contended that press reports on the return of 
prisoners of war transformed “private homecomings into a celebration of national 
unity.”92 These returning soldiers fed into a preexisting rhetoric and memory of German 
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suffering “at Soviet hands, but the invocation of the past that they represented also 
allowed their stories to become commentaries on the development of West German 
society during the decade since the war’s end.”93 For Frank Biess, issues related to 
prisoners of war, their return, and their integration into society significantly defined 
narratives of the war and postwar.94 Sasha Schießl echoes Moeller in his recently 
advanced argument that Friedland and the return of German soldiers played a significant 
role in memory and anti-Communist rhetoric in the emergent Cold War.95 In particular, 
the camp’s reputation as a “Gateway to Freedom” dovetailed with the Heimkehrer 
experience of leaving communist imprisonment and entering the freedom of the Federal 
Republic via Friedland. 
 The return of prisoners of war is a particularly interesting element of the facility’s 
history, because it exhibited a reversal of concerns about order and the arrival of 
individuals at Friedland. The absence of millions of fathers and husbands from German 
society due to their incarceration in POW camps had underscored the need for women to 
undertake men’s work in the early postwar period. The arrival of POWs offered a return 
to the stability of supposedly normal household and workplace gender divisions. 
Returning POWs were to lessen the so-called “surplus of women” (Frauenüberschuss) 
and solve the vexing problem of the “women standing alone” (alleinstehende Frauen).96 
Thus, in contrast to the specter of chaos presented by the masses of refugees, expellees, 
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orphaned youths, and resettlers from 1945 to 1950, the 1955 return of POWs purportedly 
offered a reinvigoration of order and stability. If Friedland had sought to provide orderly 
conditions for the aforementioned groups out of necessity, then its role with POWs was 
to facilitate the reintroduction of the men and reestablishment of “normal” family life. 
The camp so closely associated with groups seen as injurious to social order, would also 
ease the return of male soldiers was thought to naturally promote social order.97 
 An examination of international and German newspaper reports about 
Heimkehrer returns during the 1950s, however, offers counter-narratives of skepticism 
that coexisted with the overall joyful narratives of return highlighted by Moeller and 
Schießl. In fact, the celebrations in October 1955 were accompanied by an American 
preoccupation with returning Nazis. The New York Times in particular focused its 
reporting on high-ranking Nazis, who it featured alongside stories of joyful returns and 
tearful reunions now familiar from the historiography. One article offered a sympathetic 
portrayal of General Walther von Seydlitz, who had surrendered at Stalingrad and 
engaged in anti-Nazi propaganda thereafter.98 The article particularly dwelled on the fact 
that the majority of Seydlitz’s compatriots had ostracized him. The next day, the paper 
noted the arrival of Harald von Bohlen und Halbach, who, it reported, had headed the 
“Krupp industrial empire.”99 The paper also noted the return of security chiefs and aides 
to major figures such as Hitler and Rudolf Hess, as well as Karl Clauberg, who had run 
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medical experiments at Auschwitz.100 The New York Times was even attuned to 
stereotypes of German officers when it ran a short, tongue-in-cheek article reporting the 
Soviets had taken German generals’ monocles despite the generals’ protests that they 
were “not only decorative but necessary.”101 
 Much like in the New York Times, the reporting in the Times of London 
counterbalanced news of joyous returns with worries about their effects. Although the 
Times also regularly mentioned the return of generals through Friedland, it was less 
concerned about returning Nazis. In fact, one article discussed how the repatriation of 
certain Nazis would be beneficial, because they could help to clarify the final hours of 
Hitler’s regime.102 The return of soldiers could still prove problematic for the Federal 
Republic in other ways, according to the Times. For instance, there was the issue of the 
749 prisoners released to Germany without the pardon most of their comrades had 
received. The paper lamented that the West German spokesman was “uninformative 
about the manner in which the Federal Government proposed to treat [these] 
prisoners.”103 The article concluded, “If they are handed over in custody the Federal 
authorities will plainly have to take a decision to do something with them.”104 Another 
problem for the West German state that arose in the paper’s reporting was how the 
prisoner returns would affect East-West German relations. Articles discussed a need to 
avoid injuring East German opinion because the passage of prisoner transports through 
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East Germany required their cooperation. Boisterously joyful receptions at Friedland 
threatened to exacerbate strained relations between the German states, in part because 
East German authorities hoped soldiers would choose to stay in their country.105 The 
delayed arrival of a transport thus led to speculation that the East Germans had forced to 
the transport to travel during the night in order that it might arrive in the early morning 
hours, thus preventing further celebration.106 
 If international reports on the events of October 1955 at Friedland voiced implicit 
worries about returning prisoners even as they celebrated the reunion of families, then 
they echoed a similar ambivalence about returning prisoners evident in reporting about 
Heimkehrer in German newspapers some five years earlier.107 One such example of 
domestic German ambivalence can be found in a January 1950 story from the major 
German press agency Deutsche Presse Agentur about the transport of former SS men out 
of Soviet imprisonment to Friedland.108 What the DPA found particularly troubling was 
the group of reeducated anti-fascists who wore civilian clothes and large fur hats in 
contrast to the other, presumably shoddily-clothed prisoners. The former SS soldiers 
refused to accept greetings from the camp pastor, to eat within the camp, or to take part in 
the search for missing persons through the camp’s picture search service. When asked 
about their reception by German and British authorities at the border, the now-communist 
fanatics dismissed it as a “pure propaganda activity.” Without further comment on the SS 
men, the article then went on to note that the members of the transport would be released 
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to their home cities in the coming days, leaving the unsettling implication that such 
destabilizing men would soon be about in Germany. 
 The fact that this troubling press report was discredited within the next two weeks 
makes the episode all the more intriguing. A Hamburg man evidently familiar with 
Friedland camp staff wrote a letter to the Welt am Sonntag, which had run the article 
under the headline “Twice Misled” (Zweimal Verführt).109 The author claimed that the 
article had not accurately related the facts of the situation: some of the returning prisoners 
who had been “Waffen-SS men” were better clothed than the others and had behaved 
guardedly, but that was all. “Neither the camp pastor nor the camp administration in 
Friedland knew anything about Waffen-SS Heimkehrer declining supervision from the 
Red Cross or refusing to disclose information about the missing.”110 Of course, the low 
likelihood of survival for the hard core of SS soldiers in Soviet prisons means it is hardly 
surprising that someone should raise doubts about the original report. What the initial 
story and subsequent publication of a letter debunking it do reveal is how prepared the 
press was to focus on the most destabilizing elements of the populations moving through 
the Friedland elements, even if such fears proved untrue. 
 An examination of newspaper articles about the return of prisoners of war in 1950 
and 1955 thus helps to complicate the fond narratives in commemorative literature and 
which have been studied in the recent historiography of Friedland and the Federal 
Republic. To be sure, prisoner returns have been analyzed for their celebratory aspects in 
media presentations and memory because these events were often seen as positive 
developments. Press reports from the final 1955 returns, such as those discussed by 
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Moeller, were largely celebratory because this group of prisoners represented the 
culmination of the long fight to bring Germany’s last soldiers home. The news reports 
discussed above offer a counter-narrative to stories of a solely joyous reception.111 The 
examples of reports from 1950 and 1955 suggest that newspapers had ample experience 
seeing ambivalences in the movement of various groups around and through the 
Friedland camp, so they were therefore quick to voice uneasiness about individuals 
during these otherwise happy episodes. 
                                                 
111
 Indeed, such a narrative would be fundamentally distorted anyway by the elision of the mass 
disappointment for those families whose worst fears were confirmed when their loved ones were not among 
this final gasp of returnees. 
   
 
  
CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 The Friedland transit camp was initially established in the fall of 1945 as a 
stopgap measure to provide immediate aid and relief for refugees along the common 
border of the British, American, and Russian zones of occupation. During the postwar 
decade of 1945-1955 the facility played a crucial role in the lives of the nearly two 
million individuals it processed by providing food, shelter, medical assistance, and search 
services for missing persons to these displaced masses. The establishment and operation 
of the Friedland facility was thus clearly a response to humanitarian imperatives, but it 
also contributed significantly to efforts to reestablish an orderly German society in the 
aftermath of World War II and amidst mass population transfers. A sort of regulated 
humanitarianism was necessary in order to produce a manageable region for British 
military administration, and this paradigm helps to explain camp operation from 1945 to 
1955. The camp at Friedland fulfilled the interconnected necessities for aid and order not 
only by helping individuals in order alleviate the humanitarian crisis, but also through the 
identification, registration, and redirection of these uprooted individuals to cities and 
areas of the countryside that could accommodate them. This process further played a role 
in establishing which Germans would be eligible for compensation in the forthcoming 
programs to equalize war burdens, thereby buttressing social cohesion through further 
relief of suffering and by offering expellees an investment in their new home. 
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 The regulated humanitarianism at work in the Friedland camp relied upon the 
surrounding communities and simultaneously contributed to social reconstruction. 
Attempts to organize volunteers, whether through religious or secular charities, had the 
side benefit of rebuilding public, associational life following the war. Drawing upon 
informal networks of friends, Nazi organizations disbanded by the military occupation 
government, and newly formed student groups, the volunteer efforts at Friedland offered 
a safe, military-government-approved public space for organization and the normalization 
of social interaction. Moreover, the cooperative efforts between British volunteers and 
the students who would subsequently make up the professional German classes offered 
an important chance for reconciliation and a deepening understanding between former 
enemies. This was particularly significant at a moment when anti-fraternization rules for 
soldiers would have otherwise made such interaction more difficult if not impossible. 
 More than just a means to address issues of order, the Friedland facility played a 
role in shaping concerns about criminality, stability, and humanitarian obligations. The 
camp could address all manner of issues – such as public health dangers, the loss of 
identification, and the need for food and shelter – by concentrating destitute refugees and 
expellees in at specific location, but such a concentration also generated new problems. 
The camp pulled the destitute toward itself, thereby creating conditions for a perception 
of rising criminality, which the camp then proactively addressed through the 
establishment of a youth camp. Likewise, the camp’s existence led to the concentration of 
poor resettlers at the Lower Saxon border with Thuringia, which stoked British fears of 
economic ruin and a resulting social collapse in a manner that might not have occurred 
had the resettlers from Poland crossed the border in a more diffuse, illegal manner. In this 
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way, the camp came to affect a geopolitical conflict between the Western Allies and 
communist Eastern Bloc, albeit briefly and to an admittedly uncertain extent. 
 Such consideration of the Friedland camp as a physical space leads to a final 
conclusion. Friedland may have been an expedient for addressing the host of social 
concerns addressed in this paper, but the incidents surrounding the youth camp, resettlers 
from Poland, and returning prisoners of war also demonstrate that the camp was a space 
onto which government authorities, the press, and, presumably, the public projected fears, 
aspirations, and joys. Concerns about unsupervised youths, worries about impoverished 
refugees and expellees without work, and the ambivalence about returning soldiers’ 
commitment to a free, liberal, and democratic Germany after years in communist prisons 
all found their expression in news reports about the camp. Yet as suggested by common 
use of the camp’s moniker, “The Gateway to Freedom,” the West German public also 
came to project hopes for a better future on the Friedland facility.
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APPENDIX 
 
Persons Processed at Friedland, 1945-1955112 
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 Data reproduced from “Grenzdurchgangslager Friedland, 1945-1955,” 20-21. 
Year 
Refugees 
from East 
to West 
Resettlers 
Part of 
Operation 
Link 
Evacuated 
Refugees 
and 
Expellees Heimkehrer 
Child 
Transports Foreigners Others Total 
         
1945 344,493 0 198,474 8,104 0 2,024 0 553,095 
1946 493,090 0 41,189 44,634 0 4,186 0 583,099 
1947 58,555 0 17,438 129,909 0 19 0 205,921 
1948 22,248 0 3,402 179,300 765 0 0 205,715 
1949 11,027 0 2,530 150,062 2,365 403 0 166,387 
1950 6,207 34,162 1,464 21,114 1,608 743 0 65,298 
1951 1,416 19,010 563 1,075 770 706 1,186 24,726 
1952 3,981 3,258 214 784 99 42 1,646 10,024 
1953 2,972 1,778 166 5,983 173 0 684 11,756 
1954 148 1,583 56 4,757 198 0 675 7,417 
1955 432 1,581 10 10,050 10 0 675 12,758 
         
Total 944,569 61,372 265,506 555,772 5,988 8,123 4,866 1,846,196 
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